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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the possibility that the quality of corporate governance has effects on the dynamic relationship 
between CEO compensation and firm performance. Building on the dynamic view of CEO pay and firm performance 
and corporate governance literature, we find that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to provide 
high powered long-run incentives to CEOs, indicating CEO incentive contracts can be replaced by the role of 
external corporate control when the external control mechanism is not functioning effectively from the optimal 
contracting view. Overall, the findings imply that firm’s governance mechanism can generate cross-sectional 
variations in CEO long-term incentive contracts. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
he long-term dynamic nature of CEO pay and performance has been limited in prior empirical 
literature) despite its theoretical and practical implications (e.g., Joskow and Rose, 1994). Researchers 
have exclusively emphasized estimating the contemporaneous pay-performance relationship (Antle 
and Smith, 1986). Very few studies have attempted to explore the existence of multi-period dynamic compensation 
structures. For example, Ahn (2015) empirically presented comprehensive evidence on the existence of a dynamic 
performance-pay relationship for CEOs. It shows that firms do target a long-run CEO compensation structure that is 
based on both current and past firm performance. In addition, the typical firm converges toward its long-run target 
compensation profiles at a rate of nearly 100% in a year, indicating that firms take steps to offset deviation from 
their optimal CEO pay (Ahn, 2015). 
 
Building on Boschen and Smith (1995)’s dynamic nature of the CEO pay for performance relationship, this study 
attempts to uncover the cross-sectional variation in the dynamic relationship between CEO compensation and firm 
performance. One potential contingency for generating the variations in CEO compensation contracts is the quality 
of a firm’s external corporate governance, serving a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between 
shareholders and managers (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). The optimal contract view maintains that information 
asymmetry generates the links between CEO incentive systems and firm value, predicting the existence of an 
optimal target CEO pay (Holmstrom, 1999; Wang, 1997). However, recent evidence on CEOs’ opportunistic 
behaviors such as option back-dating and gaming their pay system negates the view of CEO compensation as 
optimal incentive contracts and that poor governance exacerbate such relationship (Garvey and Milbourn, 2006; 
Heron and Lie, 2007; Lie, 2005). As noted by Bebchuk and Fried (2003) in the following quote, compensation 
arrangements are often likely to be shaped by managerial influence, which leads to departure from the optimal target 
in directions favorable to executives.  
 
“… market forces are not sufficiently strong and fine-tuned to assure optimal contracting outcomes…  the 
constraints they(markets) impose are far from tight and permit substantial deviations from optimal 
contracting.” (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003: p.74).  
 
In brief, we explore the possibility that the quality of corporate governance moderate the dynamic relationship 
between CEO compensation and firm performance. Specifically, we test the concern that strong pay for “long-run” 
performance is raised in importance when external monitoring is weak. From the optimal view, pay that is strongly 
linked to long-run past performance is particularly pronounced in firms with weak external governance such that one 
T 
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mechanism (incentive compensation) may compensate for the other (monitoring) to better align with the long-term 
interests of shareholders. This is because firms with weak external corporate governance require commitment to 
long-run incentives for CEOs in order to prevent the CEO from engaging in short-term oriented actions, which in 
turn leads to implement a strong pay for “long-run” performance to bolster weak investor protections.  
 
2.   THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 The key idea behind the dynamic long-run relationship of CEO pay to firm performance is straightforward. In a 
dynamic agency model, CEO compensation can be characterized as the sum of a fixed level of compensation plus 
the compensation associated with current and past performance (Boschen & Smith, 1995; Wang, 1997; Ahn, 2015). 
That is, the firm provides the CEO an incentive composed of current performance-based pay and a series of future 
expected compensations based on a history of firm’s past performance. By linking contemporaneous pay to multiple 
periods of performance increases firm efficiency in attenuating effects of incomplete information about the top 
executives’ actions and efforts (Wang, 1997; Holmstrom, 1999). In practice, top executives are indeed involved in 
multi-year long-term relationships with their firms, and one should examine the dynamic relationship between 
compensation and performance to find the complete pay-performance relationship (Boschen and Smith, 1995). In 
this setting, Ahn (2015) empirically show that realized future CEO pay levels should be affected by current and 
future performance.     
 
Greater efforts have been devoted to examining alternative explanations and criteria for how CEO compensation is 
set. Two competing theories emerge. On the one hand, firms are optimizing with regard to CEO pay level in a way 
that maximizes the net expected economic value to shareholders as discussed in Demsetz and Lehn (1985). For 
instance, Fama (1980) posits that labor market discipline decreases agency problems with CEOs. They know that 
any opportunistic behavior will be penalized by a downward revision of the human capital value. In contrast, 
managerial power theorists criticized that optimal contracting approach imposes strict assumption that in setting 
executive compensation, directors take an adversarial position against CEOs and that the board is viewed as serving 
shareholder interests exclusively and bargaining with management in an arm’s length way (Bebchuk et al, 2002), 
while managerial power view see these as not strong enough to follow optimal contracting model. Although both 
managerial power approach and agency theory has in common in explaining the executive compensation in that 
there is a agency problem such that the firm has well-diversified shareholders. But they take the recognition in 
different directions.  
 
Managerial power theorists, Bebchuk et al. (2002) particularly focus on two preconditions that might generate CEO 
compensation that are optimal for shareholders. First mechanism is that the board operating at arm’s length, 
determines the compensation structure that maximizes shareholder value. The optimal contracting view believe that 
the board has an important role in the process of setting CEO pay serving shareholder interests in this setting and 
bargaining with top management in an arm’s length way (Bebchuk et al., 2002). The board has a full discretion to 
change the executive compensation on a certain periodic basis. The directors of large U.S public companies 
typically have established compensation committees that they delegate such responsibility to. Core et al. (1999) 
recognized the limitations of this assumption, but the full force has not been generally paid attention to the executive 
compensation literature (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2002; Murphy, 2013).  
 
Second, although the board behaves under the influence of top management, executives are limited by market forces 
such as large investors that own at least 5 % of the outstanding shares of the firm. (blockholder, thereafter) and 
institutional investor to determine the compensation that best serves shareholder interests. Additionally, shareholders 
can use their rights within corporate law to block pay arrangements that are not best for shareholders. This may lead 
to force executives to adopt arrangements that maximize shareholder value. Again, managerial power view sees 
above-mentioned mechanisms not being strong enough to follow optimal contracting model (Shliefer and Vishny, 
1997). 
 
There is large evidence that the presence of a large shareholder (or blockholder) is important. When blockholder 
does not have a controlling position, its monitoring can decrease the excess pay (Bebchuk et al., 2002).  Kole and 
Lehn (1997) examined the extent to which monitoring and incentive alignment of CEO compensation and influence 
patterns of various determinants on CEO pay is strongly related to ownership distribution in the firm. They use data 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2016 Volume 32, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 663 The Clute Institute 
which include the information of 175 CEO in manufacturing industry and find evidence that the level of monitoring 
and incentive alignment is greater in owner-controlled with 5 % of external shareholder- it is called “blockholder” 
than management-controlled firms. In the owner-controlled firms, there is more influence over CEO pay by major 
shareholders and board of directors while the CEO pay influence is isolated from major shareholders and boards. 
They suggest that a behavioral approach (managerial power theory) shed lights on the process to determine CEO 
pay. 
 
One interesting study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) suggest that the absence of shareholder owning more 
than 5% of the shares is related to significant deviation from optimal contracting. In the first section of their study, 
they examine companies with and without a large shareholder to examine if there is a difference in the extent to 
which CEOs are rewarded for changes in firm performance beyond their control- they call this “luck”. The results 
indicate that CEOs in firms lacking large external shareholders seemed to receive more luck-based pay. The results 
show that an additional large shareholder on the board decreases pay for luck by approximately 30 percent.  
 
Their results indicate that both views hold some way; firms with weak governance are consistent with the 
predictions of managerial power view, while firms with strong governance fit the predictions of the optimal 
contracting view. Large shareholders are particularly important as CEO stays longer with the firm, fitting the idea 
that unconstrained CEOs can entrench themselves over time. Additionally, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) 
suggest that firms with good quality of corporate governance charges CEOs more for options they were granted 
because options contain a gift component since CEO does nothing when they have value from the intrinsic volatility 
of the stock. Thus, firms with better governance features are better charge their CEOs and better able to remove this 
gift by cutting the other components of pay (cash and bonus). 
 
Some studies have also suggested that a firm’s control mechanism, especially the existence of active monitoring, can 
generate cross-sectional variations in CEO compensation contracts (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983). Included is the 
existence of large outside block-shareholders and shareholder protection. Scholars have theoretically addressed the 
substitution relationship between internal control such as compensation contracts and external control mechanisms, 
including outside block-shareholders and shareholder protection (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983). That is, the 
importance of managerial incentive contracts as internal governance is particularly pronounced when external 
monitoring (or control) is ineffective and costly (e.g., Beatty and Zajac, 1994). Thus, incentive compensation that is 
strongly tied to the firm performance is therefore appropriate when there is weak monitoring. It is concluded that the 
desired level of CEO incentive is contingent on the quality of a firm’s external corporate governance because of a 
needed interaction (i.e., substitution) between the monitoring of top executives and incentive compensation (Beatty 
and Zajac, 1994).  
 
The comprehensive survey by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) of over 400 executives on their corporate 
financial decisions points at the temporal orientation of institutional owners. It finds that lack of institutional owners 
or block-holders induces a greater short-term CEO orientation; it may encourage CEO actions that bolster 
speculation and short-term myopic performance. This is because weak shareholder rights or absence of large outside 
block-holders might shield managers from outside monitoring, thereby encouraging the executives to boost “easily 
observable” short-term performance at the expense of long-run firm fundamental value (Stein, 1988). For instance, 
according to Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005)’s survey, 80% of respondents report that in poorly governed 
firms, executives are more likely to be spurred by speculation in stock markets and take on short-term actions like 
earning manipulations by decreasing discretionary expenditure on R&D, advertising and maintenance, for example, 
and even delaying profitable new projects and capital expenditures to boost short-term stock prices (Bolton and 
Dewatripont, 2005). Consequently, firms with weak external corporate governance are more likely to have difficulty 
in raising external funds in the long-term from outside investors unless they provide supplementary investor 
protection (Stein, 1988). Therefore, a certain form of intervention may be required to prevent CEOs’ short-term 
orientation and to make a better alignment with the long-term interests of shareholders.  
 
We have argued that weak monitoring induces CEOs’ short-run oriented behaviors such as earnings manipulation 
that could potentially cost interests of shareholders. It is expected that CEO incentive contracts can be determined by 
institutional investors and replaced by the role of external corporate control when the external control mechanism is 
not functioning effectively. Combining these arguments, we posit that firms with weak external corporate 
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governance require commitment to long-run incentives for CEOs in order to prevent the CEO from engaging in 
short-term oriented actions, which in turn leads to implement a strong pay for “long-run” performance. This leads to 
the competing following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: The relationship between current pay and past long-run performance will be stronger in the firms 
with weak external corporate governance. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The relationship between current pay and past long-run performance will be stronger in the firms 
with strong external corporate governance. 
 
3.   METHODS 
 
3.1 Sample  
 
 The sample construction is almost identical with Ahn (2015) except the fact that we included corporate governance 
measures from IRRC. The governance measure, Gompers G is obtained from the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) that publishes listings of corporate provisions for individual firms in Corporate Takeover Defenses 
(Gompers et al., 2001). These data are derived from different public sources including corporate bylaws and 
charters, proxy statements, annual reports, as well as 10-K and 10-Q. The IRRC population covers most of the 
value-weighted market including NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. We first constructed a sample from all CEOs 
included in the Executive Compustat (ExecuComp) and merged the sample with firm characteristics from the 
Compustat Industrial Annual data for the time period of 1992 to 2003. The ExecuComp data includes information 
on the compensation for the top executives of all the firms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P SmallCap 
600 as disclosed in the proxy statements. The data include information on cash compensation such as bonus and 
salary, the value of granted stock options, and restricted stocks in the current year. We exclude financial firms and 
utilities, since corporate governance of these regulated industries may reflect special factors (Murphy, 1999). 
Scholars have argued that in regulated industries, managerial discretion decreases as does the sensitivity of firm 
value to the quality of managerial decisions (Kole and Lehn, 1997; Ahn, 2015). We also exclude any firm with 
fewer than two consecutive years of data since empirical model includes lagged variables. These exclusions result in 
complete information for 7,193 observations, which include 1,980 CEOs.  
 
3.2   Measures 
 
Dependent variable.  The Total Direct Compensation (hereafter, TDC) for the CEO is a dependent variable for the 
hypotheses. Total direct compensation is the total compensation for the individual year, comprised of the following: 
salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted, long-term incentive 
payouts, and other miscellaneous items (TDC1 from ExecuComp). We used the modified Black-Scholes model 
when determining the value of stock options.  
 
Independent variables. To capture the dynamic feature of CEO compensation, we used TDC (t-1), measured by the 
past year’s total direct compensation for a given CEO. The measure of firm performance used in this study is the 
change in shareholder wealth as used in the Jensen and Murphy (1990). The change in shareholder wealth at year t is 
defined as the rate of return realized by shareholders, multiplied by the beginning-of-period market value of the 
firm. To assess the dynamics of the pay-for-performance relationship, we include current, one-, two-, and three-year 
lags in firm performance in the model.  
 
Two different proxies for external corporate governance are used. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2001) constructed 
the governance index (hereafter, G-index) as the number of restrictions on shareholder rights. The index was 
constructed by adding one point for every provision that restricts shareholder rights (i.e., increases managerial 
power). The IRRC tracks 22 charter provisions, bylaw provisions, and other firm-level rules plus coverage under six 
state takeover laws; duplication between firm-level provisions and state laws yields 24 unique provisions. Examples 
are ‘tactics for delaying hostile bidders;’ ‘voting rights’; ‘director/officer protection’; ‘other takeover defenses’; and 
‘state laws’ (Gompers et al., 2001). Thus, the G-index is the sum of one point for the existence of each provision. A 
higher G-index implies weak governance in that there are more restrictions on shareholder rights and the manager 
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has more discretion and is shielded against takeover threats. For strong restrictions, shareholders are less likely to 
engage in active monitoring.  
 
Additionally, we measure outside shareholder control by using outside block-holder ownership provided by Dlugosz 
et al. (2006). Investors with more than or equal to 5% of the total stock ownership are considered to be block 
shareholders. If the block-holders are not officers, directors, affiliated entity, or ESOP employees, such block-
holders are classified as “outside” block-holders and presumed to be in the best position to monitor management. 
 
Control variables. The control variables include the firm characteristics, such as size (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 
1988) and growth opportunity (Smith and Watts, 1992; Harvey and Shrieve, 2001) and risk (Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 1999). The measures of firm size are sales and market capitalization. Market-to-book ratio is included to 
control for growth opportunities market, measured by the market value of assets divided by the book value of the 
assets. CEO tenure is controlled for any effect it might have on the total compensation. To control for firm risk, past 
five-year volatility of monthly stock returns is used. We also CEO fixed effects to control for CEOs’ unobserved 
heterogeneity. Finally, we include year fixed effects to control for any temporal year effects that might influence the 
results.  
 
3.3   Empirical Specification  
 
We estimate dynamic panel fixed-effect regression models whose dependent variable is total pay level, and one-year 
lagged total pay level is included as an explanatory variable. It is worth noting that we estimate the size of the effect 
of previous pay level, thereby avoiding the potential downward bias against finding the effects of past firm 
performance (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981). Similar to the recent empirical study, we attempt to minimize the 
statistical bias due to the correlation between unobserved CEO heterogeneity and the lagged total pay level. To do 
so, we use dynamic panel regression models introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991). In our empirical 
specification, we retest whether compensation level depends on both current and past long-run firm performance 
drawing upon the dynamic agency perspective; and (2) whether there is an interaction between firm performance 
and external corporate governance on CEO pay.  
 
The typical CEO t compensation measure is total direct compensation that is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual 
compensations, the total value of restricted stock granted, the total value of stock options granted (using the Black-
Scholes formula), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total compensations. The model incorporates the 
possibility that target compensation levels might differ across firms or over time by specifying a target CEO pay 
level of the form 
 
*
, 1 , 2 , 1 , 1 ,
, , 1 ,
...
(1)
c
i t i t i t p i t p c i t
d i t e i t p i t
TDC R R R X
G R G
β β β β
β β
− − +
− +
= + + + +
+ + ×
 (1)  
 
where *
,TDC i t
 is a desired total direct compensation level for CEOi at t, ,i t jR −  
j = 1, …,  p is  j year lagged firm performance, 
,
cX i t
 is a vector of firm characteristics related to optimal CEO pay 
level, where 1 2{ ... }d eβ β β β β= is a coefficient vector and 
'
, , , 1 , 1 ,{ ... }
c
i t i t i t i t p i tX R R R X− − += , ,i tG is 
Gompers G or block-holder ownership, our corporate governance measure.  
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4.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for all variables are reported in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of All Variables 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Total Direct 
Compensationa 4,098 12,100         
2. Current Performancea 
(Change in Shareholder 
Wealth t) 
505 7,478 0.042        
3. Cumulative Past 2-year 
Performancea 844 9,358 0.133 -0.081       
4. CEO Tenure (years) 7.75 7.60 -0.014 -0.005 -0.008      
5. Firm Sizea 3,841 11,295 0.163 0.139 0.175 -0.063     
6. Risk (Stock return 
volatility) 0.45 0.24 0.046 -0.061 -0.086 -0.058 -0.165    
7. Market to Book Ratio 2.51 12.11 -0.008 0.038 -0.004 -0.013 -0.040 0.056   
8. Governance Index 
(Gompers G) 9.22 2.71 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.104 -0.018 -0.226 -0.091  
9. Outside Blockholder 
Ownership (%) 17.00 14.00 -0.072 -0.078 -0.174 -0.076 -0.195 0.142 0.096 -0.082 
Note. n= 7,193 (sometimes fewer because of missing observations) 
a The variable is measured in $1,000 units.  
All correlations above |.03| are significant at the .05 level.   
 
Table 2 reports the results of estimating the fixed-effect dynamic panel regression models to assess the impact of 
interaction between firm performance and external corporate governance on CEO pay. Column (1) presents the pay-
performance sensitivity using Arellano and Bond (1991) in order to control for the bias in fixed-effect dynamic 
panel. We sort our sample into two groups according to G-index. The median number of restrictions on shareholder 
rights is 9. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 present the estimates pay-performance relationship using lower G-index 
(i.e., G < 9) and higher G-index (i.e., G>=9) groups respectively. Consistent with the results in the previous section, 
both current and past firm performances are positively associated with total CEO pay (TDCt). However, the effect of 
contemporaneous performance for firms with strong shareholder rights shown in column (1) is larger than its 
counterpart for firms with weak shareholder rights. However, the results regarding the effect of long-term past firm 
performance are quite opposite: the coefficient of past stock performance for firms with weak shareholder rights is 
about twice as great as one for strong shareholder rights.  
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Table 2. External Corporate Governance and Pay-Performance Relationship (t-statistics in parentheses) 
Variable Dependent Variable: Total Direct Compensation (TDC) t (1)a (2)b (3)c 
Total Direct Compensation (TDC)t-1 
0.101* 
(1.93) 
-0.051 
(-1.40) 
-0.065** 
(-2.17) 
Current Performance 
(Change in Shareholder Wealth ($1,000) t) 
0.204** 
(2.52) 
0.091** 
(2.38) 
0.154*** 
(5.34) 
Cumulative Past two-year Performance 
(Change in Shareholder Wealth from year t-3 to t-1) 
0.165** 
(2.00) 
0.313*** 
(6.75) 
0.175*** 
(5.00) 
Outsider Block-holder Ownership t-1   
2533.879 
(0.05) 
Current Performance ⋅ Outsider Block-holder Ownership   -0.005 (-0.73) 
Cumulative Past two-year Performance ⋅ Outsider Block-
holder Ownership   
-0.018*** 
(-2.67) 
CEO tenure (years) t-1 
-1.58e+04 
(-0.16) 
1.96e+06 
(0.32) 
-137.452 
(-0.00) 
Firm Size t-1 
-302.901 
(-0.44) 
251.137 
(1.27) 
-0.215 
(-0.00) 
Stock Return Volatility t-1 
-3098.661 
(-1.45) 
23.963 
(0.03) 
-3477.788*** 
(-3.43) 
Market to book ratio (1%) t-1 
-1219.448 
(-0.55) 
12755.954*** 
(6.80) 
1075.910 
(0.54) 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
CEO-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Na 864 719 1,481 
* p <0.1 ** p <0.05, ***p <0.01, per two-tailed tests 
Note: (1)a represents estimates using lower G-index sample (n=864) 
(2)b represent estimates using higher G-index sample (n=719) 
(3)c represent estimates using whole sample with information on outsider block-holder ownership (n=1,481) 
 
For a robustness check, we also examine the interaction effect of block-holder ownership on CEO total pay using the 
information of outside block-holder ownership as a proxy for the existence of external corporate governance and 
long-run firm stock performance. Column (3) presents the results from estimating the CEO fixed effect dynamic 
panel using outside block-holder ownership. We introduce interactions between the outside block-holder ownership 
and current year and previous two-year stock performances. This result of current stock performance is somewhat 
different from the results using Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick’s (2006) G-index. Although the pay-
for-current performance is statistically significant, we find no statistically significant evidence that the interaction 
between the contemporaneous stock performance and outside block-holder ownership explains CEO pay level. 
However, the qualitative results for the pay-for-“past” long-term performance is statistically and economically 
significant and robust: the coefficient of the previous two year stock performance is greater than one on the current 
stock performance and, more importantly, the interaction term between outside block-holder ownership and past 
stock performance significantly explains the CEO total pay level and the effect is negative. Overall, the results here 
support Hypothesis 1a that firms with weak external corporate governance tend to commit to long-run incentives, 
thereby bolstering weak investor protections. 
 
5.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
Previous studies have argued that long-term components are an important part of performance-based compensation 
arrangements for top executives (Murphy, 2013). Thus, recent empirical efforts to strengthen the pay-performance 
sensitivity that focus both contemporaneous and dynamic long-run relation may be effective since the market has 
preferred longer-term incentive structures (Boschen and Smith, 1995; Ahn, 2015). In addition, studies have argued 
that firm’s governance mechanism can generate cross-sectional variations in CEO compensation contracts (e.g., 
Murphy, 2013). Combined two arguments, the aim of the study is to explore the possibility that the quality of 
corporate governance moderates the dynamic relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance.  
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The results of this study show that corporate governance, specifically, firm’s external monitoring proxied as 
institutional owners or block-holders is an important part of dynamic performance-based compensation 
arrangements.  Put another way, lack of institutional owners or block-holders induces a greater short-term CEO 
orientation. This is because weak shareholder rights or absence of large outside block-holders might shield managers 
from outside monitoring, thereby encouraging the executives to boost “easily observable” short-term performance at 
the expense of long-run firm fundamental value. In such setting, a certain form of institutional arrangements may be 
required to prevent CEOs’ short-term orientation and to make a better alignment with the long-term interests of 
shareholders (Zingale, 1998). We test the possibility that firms with weak external corporate governance require 
commitment to long-run incentives for CEOs in order to prevent the CEO from engaging in short-term oriented 
actions, which in turn leads to implement a strong pay for “long-run” performance. 
 
This paper presents the first comprehensive evidence on its moderating effect of the quality of firm’s external 
governance building on the existence of a dynamic performance-pay relationship for CEOs.  The results show that 
firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to provide high powered long-run incentives to CEOs. 
Evidence implies that CEO incentive contracts can be determined by institutional investors and replaced by the role 
of external corporate control when the external control mechanism is not functioning effectively. This is consistent 
with the theoretical claim that organizations take positive steps to bolster weak investor protections from the optimal 
contracting view (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  
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